

THE ESSENTIALS ON...

Commission de la
**CULTURE, DE L'ÉDUCATION
ET DE LA COMMUNICATION**



Commission
DES LOIS



... the incidents at the Stade de France on 28 May 2022

CHAMPIONS LEAGUE FINAL AT THE STADE DE FRANCE: AN INEVITABLE FIASCO

On 28 May 2022, images relayed by television channels and social networks showed scenes of chaos around the Stade de France, which was hosting the UEFA Champions League final.

The many difficulties encountered that evening did not prevent the match from being held or the trophy from being presented. But they did raise serious questions about France's ability to organise major sporting events, particularly in view of the Rugby World Cup in 2023 and the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2024.

This failure was primarily the result of a chain of events and malfunctions that led to a weakening of the arrangements in place and temporary loss of control of the situation before and after the match.

The work carried out by the Culture and Law Commissions established that the measures put in place had significant shortcomings concerning intelligence (absence of hooligans but presence of a large number of delinquents), the routing of supporters (suppression of a diversion route on the outskirts of the stadium) and insufficient communication between the players.

Contrary to what Prefect Cadot, the interministerial delegate for major sports events (Diges), asserted, particularly concerning the security arrangements, it was not only "*in the execution that the problems occurred*". Upstream, the crisis scenarios were insufficiently worked out and did not show the necessary flexibility in the face of the multiplication of unanticipated events. Furthermore, it is unfair to have tried to blame the Liverpool team's supporters for the disturbances that occurred, as the interior minister did, in order to divert attention from the state's inability to adequately manage the crowds present and to curb the actions of several hundred violent and coordinated delinquents.

It is therefore essential to complete the analysis of the malfunctions that occurred on the evening of 28 May 2022. The events at the Stade de France are a

This "warning shot" should not call into question France's ability to organise major sporting events, provided that the players concerned, including the Government, learn the necessary lessons.

The importance of the international sporting events expected in France in 2023 and 2024 may make it possible to transform a serious collective failure into an opportunity to succeed in the coming years.

13 JULY 2022

**Chronology of events as it results from the
hearings and investigations conducted**

24 February 2022

President Macron agrees on the choice of the Stade de France to host the UEFA Champions League final

25 February 2022

Extraordinary UEFA Executive Committee meeting by video conference (UEFA)

1^{er} March 2022

Announcement of the holding of the final at the Stade de France (Minister of Sport)

4 March 2022

First meeting of the liaison group bringing together the stakeholders (UEFA, FFF, Stade de France consortium, police headquarters, interministerial delegate for major sports events - Diges, Ministry of the Interior) (Minister for Sport/FFF)

4 April 2022 / 27 April 2022 / 5 May 2022 / 16 May 2022

Meetings organised by Diges, attended by the Prefect of Police or, in the case of the last meeting, chaired by the Prefect of Police (Minister of the Interior)

19 May 2022

Meeting chaired by the Prefect of Police (Minister of the Interior)

Last meeting organised by Diges, in the presence of the Prefect of Police (Diges)

UEFA's decision to keep paper tickets, rather than using only electronic tickets¹ (Diges)

23 May 2022

Meeting chaired by the Prefect of Police (Minister of the Interior)

Request from the Préfecture de Police to remove the signs directing RER D passengers to the RER B exit path (Diges²)

RATP strike announced on line B (SNCF)

24 May 2022

RATP strike notice (Diges)

Decision to transfer part of the flows from line B to line D (RATP)

Request from the FFF that messages be sent to English and Spanish fans so that the flows are separated between RER B and D on the one hand and line 13 on the other (RATP)

25 May 2022

Note from the National Division for Combating Hooliganism (DNLH) sent to the Prefecture of Police, (Minister of the Interior)

Meeting chaired by the Prefect of Police (Minister of the Interior)

Sharing of the transport plan decided by the operators, in consultation with Île-de-France Mobilités (SNCF)

26 May 2022

Publication of a press release by RATP informing about the extent of the strike³ : (FFF)

Public communication of the transport plan: information to passengers on all media - social networks, audio announcements, etc. - inviting them to use line D (SNCF) in preference to other lines. - inviting them to use line D (SNCF) in preference.

27 May 2022

Meeting chaired by the Prefect of Police with transport operators (Minister of the Interior/Consortium)

Information to the FFF on decisions taken concerning the transfer of flows to line D (RATP)

10 hours: site visit organised by Diges, under the aegis of the regional deputy director of the transport police of the Paris police prefecture, to organise the routing of flows from the *fan zone* to the Stade de France (Diges/RATP)

28 May 2022

¹ All of the tickets for Liverpool fans and 40% for Real Madrid fans.

² Report to the Prime Minister.

³ Until 17:00, four out of five trains would run, then five out of seven.

11 h 50: Activation of the security perimeter (FFF)

12 h 00: Opening of the Madrid fan zone at the Legion of Honour Park (Diges)

14 h 00 : First demonstrations of delinquency and first attempts to break through the gates (Diges) - Opening of the Liverpool fans' fan zone in the Cours de Vincennes (Diges)

15 h 30/16 h 00: Messages in the station and on the UEFA application to take the RER D and not the B (Consortium)

17:00: Security HQ alerted to the fact that the stadia have a problem with the validation pens (FFF) - Departure of a dozen thousand people from the Cours de Vincennes fan zone (Diges)

18:00: Opening of the doors of the Stade de France (FFF) and ban on the sale of alcohol outside the stadium, which is however authorised inside (Minister of the Interior)

18:05: Start of half-hourly transmission of station counts to the stadium command post (SNCF)

18:30: Massive influx of supporters from the RER D (FFF) and slowing down of the turnstiles which are no longer functioning in accordance with the operational plan¹ (UEFA) - Overflow near the UEFA club area: the Minister of Sport's vehicle uses a technical entrance (Mayor of Saint-Denis)

18.45: Fighting at the barrier on the Écluse footbridge and two attempts to break into a VIP car park and the UEFA village to the north of the fan zone were reported (Minister for the Interior)

18:50: Decision by the authority in charge of the roadblock to divert bypassing the RER D tracks (Minister of the Interior)

18:52: First infringement noted at the turnstiles of gate Y (UEFA) - From that moment on, successive closures and reopenings of the turnstiles, victims of massive congestion (UEFA)

19:00: Very high pressure in the "narrow gap" between the RER D station and the pre-screening area (Minister of the Interior)

19:18: A diversion of people leaving the RER D is set up to redirect them to the RER B access road (Préfet de police)

19:39 to 19:54 (or 19:45 depending on the police prefect): Lifting of the screening area at gates X, Y and Z (Minister for Sport)

20:00: Request for police support at turnstiles by FFF (UEFA)

20:13: Repositioning of part of the police force inside the stadium on the south side to contain any intrusion attempts (Diges²)

21:00: Scheduled kick-off time and end of the screening zone (Minister of Sport) - 15,000 people missing from the stadium (Police Prefect) - 97% of Madrid fans are in their seats, compared to 50% (Minister of the Interior) or 63% (FFF) of Liverpool fans

21:36: Match starts (Diges³)

22:52 (or 22:45 according to the Minister of the Interior): The reception system at La Plaine-Stade de France station on the RER B train is back in place following the influx of passengers wishing to return to Paris during the match (SNCF)

23:45 / 23:50: Throwing of projectiles, bottles and other items on the west ramp at La Plaine-Saint-Denis, on the RER B line, withdrawal of agents near the ticket machines and ticket offices and opening of the validation turnstiles to protect themselves from "very angry" and "particularly drunk" Liverpool supporters - Strong presence of pickpockets on the platforms (SNCF)

It is important to note that the **competition was held in the Stade de France without any particular difficulties**. Despite the short timeframe for organising the event and a busy schedule of events, the stadium was prepared by the Stade de France consortium to meet UEFA's expectations. The pitch was changed within 48 hours to meet international standards.

¹ 6,000 people every fifteen minutes, instead of 12,500.

² Report to the Prime Minister.

³ Report to the Prime Minister.

The decision to postpone kick-off was taken in response to the problem of transporting the public from outside the stadium. There were no notable security incidents inside the stadium. Although a number of people were able to enter the stadium without a ticket, their presence did not affect the match and, where possible, they were removed during the match.

1. FAILURES DUE TO TICKETING AND THE FAN MOBILITY PLAN

A. INADEQUATE TICKETING MANAGEMENT

The work carried out established that UEFA's management of ticketing was inadequate. It is true that the issuance of paper tickets was not in itself an exceptional situation and that this possibility was in accordance with the regulations. That said, it was **known that the use of this type of ticket would result in an increase in the number of counterfeit tickets**, yet UEFA does not appear to have put in place any particular mechanism to identify the extent of this problem beforehand, even though the number of counterfeit tickets was ten times higher than the average observed (2,471 counterfeit tickets scanned, including 1,644 in the southern sector dedicated to Liverpool supporters, according to the FFF).

Furthermore, by requiring ticket validity checks at the pre-screening security points as part of the anti-terrorism measures, UEFA unwittingly contributed to the blockage of the checkpoints, particularly given the larger than usual number of people without tickets. It should also be noted that **the ticketing dispute handling system was inadequate**, which led to people who had been turned away parking in front of the screening points, as well as the inadequate training of the stewards, who seemed to be quickly overwhelmed by the situation. Finally, the ticket verification arrangements were also debated, with the use of pens to mark tickets and the electronic ticket activation and verification system not considered sufficiently practical.

Under these conditions, **the commissions recommend making it compulsory to use forgery-proof tickets** with reliable control devices¹ for the most high-stakes football competitions (international matches, derbies, etc.) and to systematically provide for a ticketing dispute settlement service as well as a support system for people who cannot use this type of ticket. In order to be able to resolve difficulties in real time, they propose to require organisers to **inform ticket holders in real time** (by email, text message, messaging service) of the arrangements for access to the Stade de France, unforeseen events and changes decided by the authorities when difficulties arise.

Finally, the commissions consider that **better training for stewards** and **better coordination between stewards and the police** are necessary.

B. A FAN MOBILITY PLAN THAT IS NOT WORKING

The preparation of the fan mobility plan was mainly the responsibility of the FFF in order to take care of the fans from the borders to the stadium. 110,000 people travelled to the stadium by RER B (6,200 people), RER D (36,000 people), line 13 (37,000 people) and 450 coaches (20,905 people), taxis (6,680 people) and light vehicles (4,111 people).

This mobility plan encountered two major difficulties (the transfer of passengers from RER B to RER D and the absence of relief tracks at the exit of the RER D station), the effects of which combined to create a crisis situation. While the forecasts for the RER B strike predicted that the service would be maintained at 80% of its capacity, the situation was not as bad.

¹ It seems that the UEFA application did not allow all e-ticket holders to activate their e-tickets to enter the stadium.

The FFF argues that the displacement from line B to line D was exacerbated by messages broadcast in stations by transporters on the afternoon of 28 May indicating that line B should not be used. These announcements, which were not foreseen in the mobility plan, would have had the effect of saturating line D, whose traffic increased from 10-15,000 people to 36,000 people. The removal of the interconnection at Gare du Nord was an additional difficulty, deterring many Liverpool fans from continuing their journey on RER B and encouraging transfers to line D beyond what was planned and necessary.

The dismantling, at the request of the police prefecture's public order and traffic department (DOPC), on 23 May of the signage installed by the FFF at the exit of the RER D station at Stade de France to mark out an alternative route to the RER B station on rue Francis de Pressensé in Saint-Denis was the second major difficulty that made managing the crisis very difficult. When the pathway at the pre-screening point became clogged, the only possible solution was to lift the control device, with the result that a large number of offenders entered the restricted area.

The commissions believe that the fan mobility plan should have taken better account of unforeseen events (strikes, postponements, etc.) and provided for alternative plans to organise postponements. As was pointed out during the hearings, although the three-month deadline allowed the event to be organised properly, it did not allow sufficient time to work through the various crisis scenarios.

Under these conditions, the committees recommend that the various players concerned (FFF, State, RATP, SNCF) jointly define a fan mobility plan, making provision for the various crisis scenarios required. The senators insist on the **need to organise effective real-time communication on the flow of supporters** between the FFF, the Police Prefecture and public transport operators and to ensure joint implementation of decisions imposed by unforeseen events (postponements of passenger flows in particular).

The committees recommend that the fan mobility plan should organise the access routes to the stadium by systematically providing sufficient alternative routes (alternative plans) as well as evacuation routes for people experiencing difficulties (unrecognised tickets, people in distress). The senators also believe that it would be useful to improve the attractiveness of the area around the Stade de France in order to encourage spectators to come earlier and leave later in order to better regulate the flow of people entering and leaving the stadium.

More generally, the senators are calling for a restoration of the number of public agents dedicated to the circulation of pedestrians and cars around the stadium (reduced from 90 to about ten).

2. AN ORGANISATION OF THE SECURITY BY THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES WHO

The hearings of the supporters' associations highlighted the fact that the organisation of match security was based on an **outdated vision of British supporters, referring to the hooligans of the 1980s**. Public officials were **almost exclusively concerned with policing** non-ticketed English supporters, who have a known habit of coming to support their team and enjoy the atmosphere of the match outside the stadium.

The organisers have thus **deprived themselves of the social means to** bring the flow of spectators to the stadium or to entertain them in the vicinity of the stadium or in safe places in town.

The following were missing: a reception by station staff to orientate spectators in their own language, adequate signage, audio or mobile phone announcements to inform them in real time, in their own language, of what was happening and in particular that the start of the match had been postponed by half an hour, which would have avoided crowds of people trying to enter the stadium...

More generally, **the reception of supporters in a festive setting was neglected**: the *fan zones* were organised late and, in the case of Liverpool supporters, far from the stadium; the ban on alcohol from 6pm onwards in the vicinity of the stadium contributed to their late arrival at the Stade de France. As the mayor of Saint-Denis, Mathieu Hanotin, pointed out, *"the organisation of fan zones, the authorisation to consume alcohol until the start of the match, as well as the musical and sporting events around the stadium, are elements of social control that make it possible to bring the population back to the area around the stadium as soon as possible, in order to make the routes more fluid and to allow as many people as possible to enter the stadium progressively."*

Finally, the fans' immediate contacts, the stewards, were unable to explain to them what was going on. They were quickly overwhelmed: placed in the unusual, if not unprecedented, situation of having to carry out an initial check on the validity of tickets at the filtering points, the stewards initially doubted the quality of the verification pens provided before, according to the police commissioner, leaving their posts in the face of pressure from the crowd. As the FFF pointed out at the hearing, it is difficult to recruit stewards who have the necessary accreditations for private security **and who are adequately trained, particularly in foreign languages**, to perform their duties at large-scale sports events. The training of security forces in dealing with a predominantly foreign crowd should also be examined.

Finally, the reception of the supporters also requires that their conditions of return after the match are good: the Spanish supporters deplored the passage on a rather narrow footbridge crossing the canal without anyone to regulate the flow, and the lack of public lighting while the ground was strewn with broken bottles...

All this suggests that **the spectator experience was not taken into account by the event organisers**.

The committees would like to see a **change in the way the public authorities view supporters** and to create the conditions for a permanent dialogue so that their representatives become partners in the preparation and running of major events. **Dialogue with supporters should enable better sharing of information and make the measures put in place more effective**.

B. UNDER-DIMENSIONED PROTECTION OF GOODS AND PERSONS

On 28 May, **the security of supporters and the protection of property were insufficiently ensured**. At his hearing, the police prefect said that the scenes of chaos described by the supporters as a result of the crime they had experienced were **due to the need to remove the filtering**, which allowed "300 to 400" "undesirable" individuals to enter the forecourt, as *"the system was no longer sufficiently watertight or dissuasive to prevent these thefts"*.

But, as the Mayor of Liverpool City Council testified, the crime **started before the screening**. The surveillance cameras even allowed some of the people present in the stadium's security headquarters to see the action of pickpockets and other pickpockets. However, the security personnel present, most of whom were dedicated to anti-terrorist measures, were unable to intervene to put an end to these acts. Once the delinquents were present on the square, their evacuation was particularly difficult and slow, taking place only after the start of the match. *"Obviously - at least that is the feeling I have - the group of these 'undesirables' (...) did not disperse and remained in the vicinity, on the outskirts of the stadium"*, causing further damage to people and property after the match and even in the vicinity of the stations, said the police prefect.

The presence of these offenders, although apparently on an unprecedented scale, was predictable. In the days leading up to the event, the staff of the Stade de France and the mayor of Saint-Denis reported an **unusual** level of **excitement around the match and the venue**. However, these observations do not appear to have led to an alert from the territorial intelligence service. Staffing levels to combat crime were therefore **under-dimensioned and insufficiently staffed**, despite multiple intrusions and thefts from mid-day on 28 May. In particular, the FFF described a **violent intrusion into UEFA's offices to steal match tickets, which** led to an initial mobilisation of police forces. The Diges report shows **209 police officers deployed around the stadium to combat crime on 28 May**, 47 more than at the French Cup final on 7 May. During the France-Denmark match on 2 June, **650 police officers, more than three times as many**, were mobilised to combat crime.

The situation on the ground was not sufficiently taken into account before the events and adaptation was too slow. It appears that the skills of the prefect of Saint-Denis and his departments would have benefited from being called upon more.

The security measures put in place around the Stade de France were intended to meet three objectives: to prevent the risk of terrorism, to maintain order and to ensure public safety. Of these three objectives, the third was neglected, while the implementation of the first two proved inadequate and was the cause of some of the violence suffered by the supporters.

3. A RIGID AND FRAGILE SYSTEM THAT LED TO A USE OF FORCE THAT SHOCKED FRENCH AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION

A. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A PRE-FILTERING SYSTEM THAT HAS BECOME A BOTTLENECK DUE TO AN ACCUMULATION OF FACTORS THAT ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

Designed to prevent terrorist attacks, the pre-screening system put in place by the police prefecture, when combined with a check on the validity of tickets by stewards, **created a bottleneck in access for spectators leaving the RER D station**. This choice was criticised by the Prefect Michel Cadot in his report to the Prime Minister, concerning on the one hand the legal basis for the combination of an anti-terrorist measure and a control of access permits by the organisers, and on the other hand the methods of managing the flow of people to this filtering point.

To defend the choice of this system, the police prefecture blamed the saturation on the number of Liverpool supporters who came with forged tickets or tried to approach the stadium without tickets. These fans would have saturated the "pre-control", which showed up to 70% errors, and then created the congestion of

In addition, there were "10 to 15,000 people" present in the access to the filtering point, an access reduced to 4 or 5 metres wide by the presence of vehicles intended to obstruct ram cars.

However, **it is the very conditions created by the prefecture of police and the lack of sufficient responsiveness that are the primary causes of incidents during pre-screening.**

Firstly, the agreement to implement a ticket validity check at pre-screening level, based on a single and apparently inconclusive precedent at the Stade de France, was **inappropriate from the outset**. It led both to neglecting the risk of crime on the square surrounding the stadium - since the

The only thing that should have been done was to slow down the influx of people who had no tickets and were not "undesirables".

of people. This is all the more true because the police prefecture does not seem to have provided a means of evacuating those who were turned away and who could not move back because of the narrowness of the access and the crowds waiting to pass. In the words of the police prefect: ***"In fact, the people rejected for lack of validity of their permit tried to pass at all costs or could no longer go back, because of the ever-increasing number of people behind them."***

The commissions advocate the separation of ticket validity checks and pre-screening points as part of terrorism prevention.

Although the SNCF indicated that it transported 12,000 more people on the day of the match than for other events of this type, it was not so much this excess number per se as the **imbalance between the management of flows from the two RER lines that caused difficulties.**

The infrastructure of the Stade de France can accommodate a flow of nearly 100,000 people for certain events: the overcrowding established by the SNCF at the exits closest to the stands intended for Liverpool supporters was therefore unusual but not disproportionate to the access to the Stadium. At issue was the **capacity of the access to the pre-screening area located in the extension of the RER D exit**, which, once a congestion of "10,000 to 15,000 people" had built up, according to the police prefect's estimate, could **lead to a risk of crushing**. This saturation threshold seems relatively low, both in terms of the normal flow of people on RER D for a match of this type (around 12,000 people) and in terms of the transfer to the RER B line due to the strike.

The director of Transilien gave the following details during her hearing: ***"At the exit of RER B, we counted 6,200 people (...), i.e. a third of what we usually carry. At the Stade de France-Saint-Denis station, we counted more than 37,000, more than three times the usual number on the RER D"***. Passenger flows from each of the RER lines were communicated every half hour from 6.05pm by the SNCF to the Stade command post. **From the outset, and especially from 6.30 p.m. onwards, the significant difference in passenger numbers between line D and line B was known.** However, this situation did not **prompt any rapid reaction to redirect the flows**, either from the transporters, who indicated that they had not been asked to do so, or from the organisers, or even from the police headquarters, which did **not** implement this redirection **until 7.18pm**, which was too late in practice to allow the pre-screening system to be maintained.

The redirection of flows was made more difficult by the decision of the police prefecture on 23 May to **dismantle the signage intended to redirect the flow of people** who had taken the RER D because of the strike on the RER B. At the hearing, the FFF stated: ***"We went so far as to plan a procedure allowing, in the event of congestion, supporters coming from the RER D to go towards the arrival of the RER B, where the avenue is wider, in order to access the Stade de France and the palpation lanes."*** However, as the inter-ministerial delegate for major sports events points out in his report, this signage was **dismantled at the request of the police prefect**, due to difficulties in directing supporters to the doors leading to their stands during a previous match.



Pedestrian flows as organised by the Prefecture of Police (its website)

If the spectators coming from the stands reserved for Liverpool supporters were numerous, it was primarily **the flow from the RER D that undermined a system that was poorly adapted to the event and too rigid**. If the police prefect considered that the flows could have been redirected a quarter of an hour earlier, it is possible to think that it was already too late to relieve the **pressure that had been building up for almost an hour**. In contrast, the filtering point located in the extension of the RER B exit and also located upstream of the stands intended for Liverpool fans did not experience any difficulties linked to crowd pressure, nor, it seems, any difficulties linked to the control of ticket validity.

B. A RECOURSE À THE FORCE RENDERED FROM FACT SYSTEM FAILURES INEVITABLE

Fans coming to the Stade de France and arriving at the pre-screening point at the RER D exit faced **two risks**. The first was the **risk of being crushed due to the blockage of the pre-screening**. The second was the risk of **being gassed as they approached the gates of the Stadium**. Faced with these risks, the police prefect first took the decision **to temporarily lift the pre-screening at 7.39pm**, and then **resorted to the use of tear gas** to make people near the gates of the Stadium move back. This second choice was not based on the need to protect people, but firstly to avoid the fall of the gates and the invasion of the stadium, which would undoubtedly have had dramatic consequences. It was therefore legitimate for the security forces to intervene to preserve public order. More generally, the interministerial delegate for major sports events indicated at his hearing:

"The sequence of events did not call for any decisions other than those taken by the police prefect, which I believe were the only ones suitable to avoid a much more serious situation.

These decisions, **while necessary to avoid a tragedy**, were the direct consequence of lack of foresight and were **the cause of incidents that shocked national and international public opinion and tarnished France's image**. The decision to lift the pre-screening **created a space on the stadium's forecourt into which the delinquents** who attacked the fans **could rush**. It allowed those who sought to enter the stadium illegally to get closer to their goal.

Faced with the risk of intrusion, the security forces used tear gas to push the crowd back. This method, which affects those present beyond those directly targeted, was seen as **particularly aggressive by supporters from countries where it is not practised**. It contributed to the supporters' feeling that they had been exposed to excessive force and even police violence.

However, the police prefect was all the more comfortable with the use of tear gas as he considered that it was the **only means available to the security forces to make the crowd back down, unless they charged them**. He also indicated that, in the same situation, he would again advocate its use, merely regretting that at the Stade de France this use had led to the exposure of bona fide persons, even families and children, to the gas.

The issue of the use of tear gas shows the **contradictions among the leaders of the internal security forces**. Indeed, contrary to the repeated assertions of the police prefect, the Minister of the Interior has admitted that **the use of tear gas should probably evolve**.

In addition to a re-evaluation of the use of tear gas, the solution lies in better management of the crowds of spectators at major sporting events upstream by managing the flows, in particular through the **use of intelligent video** and the **positioning of equestrian units**, or even **water cannons**, which have a proven dissuasive effect, and, at the time, by **clear instructions given in a language that can be understood by the people concerned**.

4. IN THE FACE OF THIS ORGANISATIONAL FAILURE, ERRORS INSUFFICIENTLY RECOGNISED AND ANALYSED BY THE PUBLIC

A. LATE AND PARTIAL RECOGNITION OF RESPONSIBILITY

1. A *minimal* political response

It was only with the announcement of the Senate committee hearings that the relevant ministers expressed **regret for the 'wasted' experience of ticketed spectators who were unable to attend the match**. Then, in the course of the hearings, came the regrets of the Prefect of Police for the bona fide people exposed to tear gas. Finally, the Minister of the Interior, following the presentation of the initial findings of the hearings, finally **apologised to the supporters who had suffered from the "poor management" of the event**.

This gradual and belated recognition contrasts with the desire to blame the Liverpool team's supporters that characterised the first official statements. While refusing, in the name of republican principles, to give the nationality of those arrested for delinquency, the Minister of the Interior, during his hearing, did not hesitate to detail the number of British nationals arrested for attempted break-ins. The **political will to make the presence of British fans appear to be the sole cause of the chaos at the Stade de France**, perhaps in order to hide the poor organisational choices made, is in any case unacceptable.

2. A clear lack of commitment to accountability: the destruction of video footage

Very quickly, the images from the video-protection systems were identified as **essential to document the facts**, in particular by the Minister of the Interior himself: these images were supposed to be able to prove the presence of tens of thousands of people in the vicinity of the stadium, to show the pressure exerted on the gates which justified the use of tear gas, or to establish the return of thousands of spectators at around 10.45 p.m. before the end of the match, which would accredit the presence of very many fans without tickets around the stadium.

However, during the hearing of French Football Federation officials on 9 June 2022, it became apparent that the **images filmed as close as possible to the incidents**, i.e. those of the Stade de France consortium, which deploys four external cameras on the four corners of the stadium, were not used.

of the stadium¹, were **automatically destroyed after seven days in the absence of a judicial requisition from the police headquarters or the public prosecutor's office**, even though those present at the security headquarters, including representatives of the police headquarters and apparently the Bobigny public prosecutor's office, had been able to observe the violence. The images from the Stade de France cameras can also be viewed on request from the DOPC command room *via* technical connections. The authorisation order provides for the possibility for the police headquarters to make a separate recording, which was not done.

As the inter-ministerial delegate for major sports events pointed out during his hearing, *"legally, it is possible to keep video surveillance images for thirty days, but the costs are considerable, hence the automatic replacement of files. I understand that citizens may find it difficult to understand that it is only a matter of automaticity."*

Neither the consortium, which should have had the presence of mind to question the judicial authorities within the reduced time limit of seven days that it set itself, nor the police headquarters, nor the Bobigny prosecutor's office, acted with diligence to safeguard evidence that was essential to the truth.

More distant images, those of the network of cameras of the police prefecture (*a priori* in Paris intramuros according to the mapping of the network) and of the city of Saint-Denis have been preserved. Those of the SNCF - in particular the La Plaine-Stade de France station on the RER B train - were partially saved, despite the fact that they had begun to be erased, in the context of a judicial requisition on 10 June. The images from the RATP (Saint-Denis Porte de Paris station on line 14) were deleted due to a lack of requisition.

Despite the invitation from the Minister of the Interior, the chairmen of the Culture and Law Committees were unable to view these images due to the lack of response from the Bobigny public prosecutor.

The rapporteurs recommend that the prefects who issue authorisations impose on a case-by-case basis on the operators of video protection systems in areas accessible to the public inside or around facilities **the retention of images captured on the day of major sporting events for the legal period of one month.**

3. An inadequate procedure for collecting fan complaints

At his hearing before the Senate committees on 1^{er} June 2022, the Home Secretary promised that British and Spanish fans would be able to lodge complaints from their own countries, with police officers sent to the scene and an "IT platform in Spanish and English", as well as letters of complaint already drafted in these languages. No online platform has been set up.

Initially, standard complaints forms were put online with the main aim of collecting complaints about the sale of counterfeit tickets. It was only after the hearing of the Prefect of Police on 9 June that these forms were translated and adapted to mention offences and locations more in line with the facts².

As for the police officers who were sent to the scene, the chairman of the *Spirit of Shankly* said at his hearing that they *"did not meet anyone from the supporters' club"*, while there were reportedly around 9,000 complaints made and forwarded to the Liverpool club.

Finally, the forms made available to fans do not provide for the collection of complaints about police actions and some are preparing to report to the national police inspectorate (IGPN), according to the director general of the Football Supporters Europ association.

¹ Prefectoral decree n° 2021-2501 authorising the renewal of a video protection system for the Stade de France - La plaine Saint-Denis consortium.

² <https://uk.ambafrance.org/Finale-de-la-Ligue-des-champions-28-29-mai-Dispositif-de-depot-de-plainte> ; <https://es.ambafrance.org/Dispositif-d-assistance-temporaire-au-depot-de-plainte-pour-les-personnes>

According to the Chancellery, as of 27 June 2022, **79 complaints** relating to the incidents of 28 May (excluding complaints about counterfeit tickets) had been **received by post** at the Bobigny public prosecutor's office, 46 of which concerned simple or aggravated theft and violence and 14 of which were directed against the police or the organisation of the event. In addition, 115 complaints were lodged directly with the police, making **a total of 194 complaints**.

B. THE MANAGEMENT OF FUTURE MAJOR SPORTING EVENTS

The many incidents that occurred on 28 May 2022 in the vicinity of the Stade de France have **raised questions about France's ability to host major international sporting events**, particularly the Rugby World Cup and the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games.

The committees do not share the view that the stakes are different, particularly given the nature of the events and the expected audience. The hearings highlighted the fact that there were no hooligans among the spectators and that the disturbances were the consequence of multiple malfunctions aggravated by the presence of a very large number of offenders. These circumstances are likely to occur again and it is therefore essential to be prepared for them.

With regard to the organisation of future major sports events expected in the years to come, one may wonder about the interest in maintaining the link between the Dijop and the Diges. The closer we get to the start of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, the more the attention of the interministerial delegation for the Olympic and Paralympic Games should be focused on this exceptional event. *On the other hand*, the organisation of the Champions League final at the Stade de France showed a lack of coordination between the different actors involved. This is why **the commissions propose that the functions of the interministerial delegate for major sports events (Diges) and the interministerial delegate for the Olympic and Paralympic Games (Dijop) should be better distinguished so that Diges is made the operational manager for the organisation of major international sports events (excluding the Olympic Games) and is given a role in coordinating the various authorities concerned (prefects, police, transporters, sports federations, local authorities, etc.)** These two services, better differentiated in terms of their responsibilities and roles, would interact closely to share their respective expertise. Nevertheless, it seems necessary for a dedicated organisation to be able to concentrate operationally on both the major sports events planned between now and 2024 and those planned between 2024 and 2026, which often require several years of preparation.

In the coming months, the Senate's culture and law commissions will organise a **precise follow-up of the preparation of future major sports events with regard to security issues**. Furthermore, the rapporteurs would like the government to submit a **report** to Parliament **on the organisation of security** at major sports events before the end of 2022.

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At the end of their work, the rapporteurs set out to formulate recommendations that stem from the situation encountered at the Stade de France. However, these recommendations are intended to be applied more broadly to major sports events.

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1 (UEFA, FFF): Make it compulsory to use forgery-proof tickets with reliable control devices for the most important football competitions (international matches, derbies, etc.) and systematically provide for a ticketing dispute settlement service as well as a support system for those who cannot use this type of ticket.

Recommendation 2 (UEFA, FFF): require the organiser to inform ticket holders in real time (by e-mail, sms, messaging service) about access to the stadium, unforeseen events and changes decided by the authorities when difficulties arise.

Recommendation 3 (UEFA, FFF, State): strengthen the training of stewards and improve the relationship between stewards and the police.

Recommendation No. 4 (FFF, State, RATP, SNCF): jointly define the mobility plan for supporters, organise effective real-time communication on flows between the FFF, the Police Prefecture and public transport operators and ensure joint implementation of decisions imposed by unforeseen events (passenger flow transfers in particular).

Recommendation no. 5 (State, FFF, Stade de France Consortium): organise the access routes to the stadium by systematically providing sufficient alternative routes (alternative plans) as well as evacuation routes for people experiencing difficulties (unrecognised tickets, people in distress).

Recommendation no. 6 (UEFA, FFF, State, Stade de France Consortium): improve the attractiveness of the area around the Stade de France in order to encourage spectators to come earlier and leave later, so as to better regulate entry and exit flows, from and to the transport system

Recommendation 7 (UEFA, police headquarters): Separate ticket validity checkpoints from pre-screening points set up for terrorism prevention.

Recommendation 8 (Ministry of the Interior): Define a doctrine for the use of tear gas by the security forces that prevents exposure of people who are not in immediate danger to them.

Recommendation no. 9 (police prefecture and, if necessary, the city of Saint-Denis): re-establish the number of public agents dedicated to the circulation of pedestrians and cars around the stadium.

Recommendation no. 10 (police prefecture): in terms of crowd management, give priority to the pre-positioning of means to dissuade any overflow (equestrian units in particular).

Recommendation 11 (Ministry of the Interior, Parliament): establish, on an experimental basis, the legislative basis that would allow operators of video protection systems in publicly accessible areas to implement image processing using artificial intelligence to count and detect crowd movements¹.

¹ Recommendation already made in [Information Report No. 627 \(2021-2022\)](#) by Marc-Philippe Daubresse, Arnaud de Belenet and Jérôme Durain, on behalf of the Law Commission, 10 May 2022

Recommendation 12 (prefects): impose on a case-by-case basis on operators of video protection systems in areas accessible to the public inside or around facilities the retention of images captured on the day of major sporting events for the legal period of one month.

Recommendation no. 13 (State, FFF): change the way the public authorities view supporters and create the conditions for ongoing dialogue so that their representatives become partners in the preparation and running of major events.

Recommendation no. 14 (State): make a clearer distinction between the functions of the interministerial delegate for major sports events (Diges) and the interministerial delegate for the Olympic and Paralympic Games (Dijop) in order to make Diges the operational manager for the organisation of major international sports events (excluding the Olympic Games) and to recognise that it has a role in coordinating the various authorities concerned (prefects, police, transport companies, sports federations, local authorities, etc.).

Recommendation 15 (State): Involve members of parliament in monitoring the security of major sports events planned in France in 2023 and 2024 and ask the government to submit a report to parliament before the end of 2022 on the organisation of their security.



**François-Noël
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